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 Omissions, Absences and Causation  
Sébastien Laliberté* 
Abstract 
Many philosophers believe that the omission of an act or that the absence of a 
cause can be causally efficacious; that they can genuinely produce effects or be the 
result of a cause. I think this view is mistaken. In this article, I will try to show 
that since omissions are not actions, they cannot be events. I will then argue that 
the most plausible account of causation available is one where causation is a 
relation between events. This would rule out the possibility of both omissions and 
absences to have any causal efficacy. The mistaken intuition behind the idea that 
omissions and absences can be causes or effects is mind-related, i.e. they depend on 
what we usually expect from events around us. Causation, on the other hand, 
should have nothing to do with what we expect. 
Consider the three following claims: 
(1) Causation is a physical relation between events. 
(2) Absences (and therefore omissions) are not events. 
(3) Absences (and therefore omissions) can be causes or effects. 
 
There is an obvious tension between those claims. Claims (1) and 
(2) together lead us directly to the conclusion that absences cannot be 
causes or effects, thereby contradicting claim (3); thus, at least one of 
these claims must be false. Yet, they may all, intuitively, appear to be 
true. The first claim is widely held to be true – at least implicitly – by 
scientists, while also being quite intuitive. The second claim is not 
obviously true but, as we will see, it seems to follow from the very 
meaning of “absence” or “omission”. The third claim seems to be 
implied by much of our everyday usage of the concepts of omissions 
______________ 
* L’auteur est étudiant au doctorat en philosophie (Université Laval). 
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and causation. We even tend to hold people legally and morally 
responsible for their omissions. In the following, assuming that all 
actions are events, I will try to show that omissions cannot be actions 
because they are not events. This would therefore mean that (2) is 
true. I will then try to show that (1) is more plausible than alternative 
accounts of causation and argue that (3) must be rejected. But first, 
some preliminary distinctions are in order. 
Omissions come in different “flavors”. Aaron can unintentionally 
fail to pay off his debts because he does not have enough money to 
do so. Bob can refrain from eating a second slice of cake because he 
is trying to lose weight. Claire can allow her teenage daughter to take 
the car for the night. All these examples involve what we may call 
“negative causation”; i.e. cases where the absence of an action seems 
to cause an event. Aaron’s non-payment seems to have been caused by 
his not having enough money. Bob’s trying to lose weight seems to 
have caused the absence of the event consisting in Bob having a 
second slice of cake. As for Claire, it seems to be her not preventing 
her daughter from taking the car that causes the ensuing event. Claire 
does not have to actually do anything in order to allow her daughter 
to leave with the car (they might have a prior agreement stating that 
her daughter can borrow the car unless Claire clearly tells her 
otherwise). Prevention is a close relative of omission in that it also 
seems to require negative causation. For instance, Diana may prevent 
the cat from coming in by closing the door. Diana’s closing the door 
causes the absence of the event consisting in the cat coming in.  
Aaron’s case is one of unintentional omission. Aaron does not 
need to do anything in order to omit to pay his debts – there need be 
no positive action for the omission to take place. The omission is, of 
course, unintentional, because in this case, Aaron did not intend to 
omit to pay his debts. Notice that the focus here is on the absence of 
action; what Aaron is omitting is what he should have done. Bob’s case 
is one of intentional omission, or refraining. As is the case with 
Aaron, it seems that Bob does not need to do anything in order to 
refrain from taking another slice1, but as opposed to Aaron, Bob does 
so intentionally. Similarly to Aaron’s case though, we are focusing 
here on the action: Bob refrains from having another slice.  
______________ 
1 This may not be entirely obvious but I will come back to this point in the 
next section. We will just assume that it is so for now. 
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Just like Aaron and Bob, Claire does not have to do anything in 
order to allow her daughter to take the car. But notice that her 
allowing can either be intentional or unintentional. If it is intentional, 
then it seems to be a case of refraining: she refrains from preventing 
her daughter from taking the car. If it is unintentional, then it would 
seem to be an unintentional omission Omissions, Absences and 
Causation: she unintentionally omitted to prevent her daughter from 
taking the car. What distinguishes allowing from the two other types 
is, I believe, merely the object we are focusing on. When we say that 
Claire allowed her daughter to take the car, we are not focusing on 
Claire’s action – or lack thereof – but on its result: her daughter 
taking the car.  
The same is true in cases of prevention like Diana’s. There are 
many ways in which Diana could have prevented the cat from 
coming in, apart from closing the door. By saying that Diana 
prevented the cat from coming in, we are not focusing on what she 
actually did in order to do so. The focus is rather on the result: the 
cat not coming in. But in contrast to Aaron, Bob and Claire, Diana’s 
preventing is a positive action; it is its effect that is an absence: the cat 
did not come in2.  
Since allowing is not genuinely different from unintentionally 
omitting or refraining, we will not be concerned with it here. Also, 
since preventing is not a case of omission, I will come back to this 
issue later when absences in general are discussed. This means that, 
for now, I will focus the discussion around unintentionally omitting 
and refraining. 
1. Are omissions actions? 
According to the standard account laid out by Davidson, for an 
action to occur, it must at the very least be caused by some desire 
(Davidson talks of “pro-attitudes”) and some relevant belief3. This 
______________ 
2 Notice that the first two categories – unintentional omission and  
refraining – can also result in absences. My unintentional omission to mail 
the letter resulted in my niece not receiving it in time for her birthday; and 
my refraining from smoking resulted in my not contracting lung cancer. 
Aaron’s omission also incidentally results in an absence. 
3 Davidson, D. (1963), Essays on Actions and Events. See especially chapter 1. 
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seems to rule out the possibility of unintentional omissions being 
actions of any kind. By definition, an unintentional omission cannot be 
the result of an intentional state. It is clear that if I omit to feed the 
cat at five because I am stuck in traffic, there is no desire of mine that 
causes this very omission. Whether I desire to feed the cat or not, it is 
still true that I will not feed the cat at five. Moreover, an omission per 
se need not involve any relevant movement or even any relevant 
mental state from the purported agent. Clarke gives the example of 
Ann, who omits to pick up Bob at the airport because she is asleep4. 
Presumably, Ann is completely still and, for all we know, she may be 
dreaming of flying unicorns. Unintentional omissions, as it appears, 
do not seem to be suitable candidates for actions5. 
Cases of refraining, however, are not as clear-cut. At first glance, it 
seems quite plausible to maintain that some belief and desire can 
combine in order to cause a refraining. For instance, John’s refraining 
to jump into the water may have been caused by his desire not to 
save the drowning child and his belief that he would not save the 
child by standing on the beach. But according to Davidson, a 
necessary condition for agency is what he calls “primitive actions”, 
namely the intentional movements that are limited to our body. So 
when I turn on the light by flipping a switch, my primitive – or  
basic – action is my finger flipping the switch. If Davidson is correct, 
omissions do not seem to meet this necessary condition. It seems to 
me that no basic action is ever bound to omissions of any kind. John 
might remain completely still (or not) while omitting to save the 
child. But whatever he does, none of his movements need be relevant 
to his omitting to save the child. There is no basic action that John 
must do in order to omit to save the child. He might not perform any 
basic action at all and he would still not save the child. So if basic 
actions are a necessary condition for agency, then omissions cannot 
be actions. 
______________ 
4 Clarke, R. (2010), “Intentional Omissions”. 
5 Notice that this does not mean that omissions are not events. 
Unintentional omissions might still be events of the non-action type, which 
can cause and be caused. Absences, for example, might still have causal 
powers. I will argue in section 3 that omissions are not events and I will 
assess the possibility of causation by absences. 
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Yet, this may not be entirely satisfying for some. Maybe some will 
remain uncertain whether intentional omissions are actions. It is 
generally agreed, however, that all actions are events. If omissions are 
not events, then, they could not possibly be actions. And as a matter 
of fact, omissions do not seem to qualify as events. Events are 
entities situated in space and time; they have a rather clear beginning, 
a clear end and can be located fairly accurately6. The eruption of 
Mount Vesuvius occurred in 79 CE in the Gulf of Naples. My waking 
up this morning occurred at six in my bedroom. Omissions, on the 
other hand, are much harder to pin down. As Clarke points out, if 
Ann omits to pick up Bob at the airport, where and when did the 
omission take place7? Did it occur at Ann’s place when she decided 
not to leave for the airport? Or did occur at the airport when she did 
not show up at the time Bob expected her? If Dick does not eat his 
soup8, when does this omission start and when does it end9? And 
suppose that, in the course of one day, I travel by plane from Quebec 
City to Chicago, by train from Chicago to Detroit and by bus from 
Detroit to Columbus. If I do not eat anything all day, where did my 
omission occur? Notice that these omissions being intentional does 
not help, for there is no more reason to believe that the forming of 
an intention marks the beginning of an omission than to believe that 
an action starts as soon as we form the intention to act. My going to 
Paris does not start when I merely form the intention to go there. 
So if omissions are neither actions nor events, then what are they? 
Most authors agree that they are nothing, they are just absences10. If 
______________ 
6 There are some fuzzier exceptions, but they are exceptions rather than the 
norm, which is not the case for omissions. 
7 Ibid., p. 162. 
8 Thomson, J. J. (2003), “Causation: Omissions”. 
9 The problem becomes even more puzzling if Dick avoids eating soup for 
his entire life. When does his omission to eat soup start and when does it 
end? Does it keep occurring for every one of Dick’s meals? Or even 
between mealtimes? 
10 See for example Armstrong, D. (2004), Truth and Truthmakers; Beebee, H. 
(2004), “Causing and Nothingness”; Clarke, R. (2012), “Absence of Action”; 
Weinryb, E. (1980), “Omissions and Responsibility”. Smith, P. (2005), 
“Feinberg and the Failure to Act” is an exception as she acknowledges that 
omissions are not actions and yet maintains that they are not nothing. But 
Smith’s criterion for distinguishing omissions from non-action is 
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this is true, what remains to be determined is whether absences have 
causal powers. 
2. Reasonable expectations 
Patricia Smith highlights two fundamental criteria for 
distinguishing omissions from both positive actions and mere non-
actions. She defines a (generic) omission in the following way11: 
 
DI. A failed to do s if and only if: 
(i) A did not do s; and 
(ii) It was reasonable to expect A to do s. 
 
As we can easily see – and as Smith herself points out –, (i) serves 
to distinguish omissions from positive actions, whereas (ii) helps 
make the distinction between omissions and non-actions. I find this 
definition quite acceptable and intuitive. Smith also proposes a more 
specific definition for unintentional omissions (refraining): 
 
DII. A unintentionally failed to do s if and only if:  
(i) A did not do s; and 
(ii) A did not think, at the time, of doing s; and 
(iii) It was reasonable to expect A to do s. 
 
Notice here that (ii) focusses on the beliefs of the agent, not on 
her desires. The key intentional element seems indeed to be the 
agent’s belief: I might desire to take today’s train for Toronto but 
unintentionally fail to do so because, unbeknownst to me, it has already 
departed. The reverse is not true. Knowing that the train is leaving 
the station, while at the same time not desiring to take it, would count 
as an intentional omission, rather than an unintentional one (assuming, 
of course, that I did not take that train). This is a key element for our 
concerns. An action s is the result of an agent’s strongest desire d 
                                                                                                 
“reasonable expectation”. Yet, this criterion has nothing to do with the 
agent and seems to play no causal role whatsoever in the event. It is therefore 
very hard to see how this would make the difference between something and 
nothing on the ontological level. 
11 Smith, P. (2005), “Feinberg and the Failure to Act”, p. 238. 
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paired with a relevant belief b. When the desire is not strong enough 
or when it is entirely absent but the agent still has the relevant belief b, 
we are facing a case of intentional omission or refraining. In contrast, 
if the agent does not entertain belief b, we are dealing with 
unintentional omission regardless of her having a desire to do s. It is on 
this last point that the idea of reasonable expectation hinges, which in 
turn helps us tell the difference between omissions and non-actions12. 
Suppose Fred desires to φ and believes that in order to φ, he 
ought to ψ. Being a rational agent, Fred further believes that he ought 
to ψ. Compare with Helen who desires to φ but who does not – 
although she should – believe that in order to φ, she ought to ψ. We 
generally accept the idea that if an agent desires an end, she must also 
desire the necessary means to that end. And if she does, all other 
things considered, she should act upon this desire. This, at least, is 
what we would reasonably expect, all things considered. An agent who 
would not follow this standard model – either by lack of desire to ψ 
or by not ψ-ing while she ought to, given that ψ is necessary for φ 
and that her strongest desire is to φ – would seem to be omitting 
something. We might say that she is omitting to behave rationally, 
that she is omitting to do what she most desires to do or that she is 
omitting to connect the dots. But all these omissions could be 
comprised under a general one: she would be omitting to meet our 
expectations13. 
______________ 
12 See also Milanich, P. (1982), “Allowing, Refraining, and Failing: The 
Structure of Omissions”. 
13 Some (e.g. ibid.; Smith, P. (2005), “Feinberg and the Failure to Act”.) 
identify two different disjunctive criteria for distinguishing cases of 
refraining from cases of non-actions : reasonable expectations or a belief by 
the agent that she could or should perform the given action. I think this 
second criterion can be reduced to that of reasonable expectation. Once we 
know the agent’s considerations, it becomes reasonable for anyone to say 
that she omitted to φ if she did not perform the action she once considered 
doing. Even if we do not agree that φ-ing is a reasonable thing to do per se, 
we would still find it reasonable to expect her to φ. For instance, I might 
decide to set the house on fire just because I am bored. I could spread 
gasoline all over the house and then sit on a couch and wait. If I do not light 
the gasoline, we could reasonably say that I omitted to set the gasoline 
aflame and that I omitted to set the house on fire even though we would not 
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Under normal circumstances, the previously mentioned 
expectations are generally regarded as reasonable. But we may 
encounter unreasonable expectations. It would be unreasonable to 
expect a crying infant to change her own diaper even if it is necessary 
for her being dry, which is what she might desire. It would also be 
quite unreasonable to expect the same infant to know what the 
necessary means to her ends are. Notice that in such cases – and, I 
surmise, in all cases of unreasonable expectations –, it would seem 
inappropriate to speak of omissions. The infant does not omit to 
change her own diaper or to identify the necessary means to her ends; 
she simply does not do so. These are clearly cases of mere non-
actions. In the same spirit, we would not be tempted to assert that a 
paraplegic is omitting to stand up during the national anthem. But we 
would not be afraid to say so about her able-bodied – and non-
sleeping – friend, whether or not he does so intentionally. Smith 
underlines the importance of context, central to this distinction:  
there is no positive act and no thought or intention by 
which to distinguish omission from simple nonaction in 
the case of unintentional omission. There is only a 
standard or pattern of human conduct, the deviation from 
which turns nonaction into omission by attaching it to a 
particular agent within a specific context. It is this 
connection that ultimately provides the needed link to 
agency and responsibility14.  
                                                                                                 
find it reasonable to do so. But given my intentions, these do become 
reasonable expectations. The agent’s considerations may not even be 
necessary. Suppose that, when coming at a fork in a path, I choose to go 
right rather then left. If going left was not unreasonable, then it would be 
perfectly acceptable to say that I omitted to go left regardless of my own 
considerations. Going left was just something that one could have 
reasonably expected me to do.  
I may be wrong on this point, but this is a rather minor detail that would not 
affect the core of my argument. If I actually am wrong and if there really are 
two disjunctive criteria rather than just one, this would merely make my 
account less “elegant”. 
14 Smith, P. (2005), “Feinberg and the Failure to Act”. 
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It is not the action – or lack thereof – that changes, but the 
normative aspect of the situation. We call one event a mere non-
action because of what we reasonably expect from the agent, and we 
call the other event an omission because we expect something else. 
Both agents might have the same beliefs and desires, for all we know, 
but that would not change our different assessments of those two 
events. It can be reasonable for me to shake hands with a guest, but it 
may be reasonable for that guest to, say, kiss me instead. From one 
point of view, I might omit to kiss him; from the other point of view, 
he might omit to shake my hand. But if my guest shared my cultural 
background, no one would be tempted to say that we omitted to kiss. 
Obviously, this is not a feature of positive actions. The reason is that 
in cases of omission, there are some core elements that are mind-
dependent and that cannot be observed empirically15. Indeed, those 
elements are what distinguishes an omission from a mere non-action. 
The notion of reasonable expectations evidently is not without 
problems. Its main weakness is the vagueness that plagues it. As 
Smith points out16, the notion of reasonableness is a slippery one. It 
relies on context and is entirely inter-subjective. Two different people 
might disagree on what is reasonable and what is not. Something can 
be considered a reasonable expectation inside a large community, e.g. 
to respect certain cultural customs. Someone who did not respect 
them would omit to respect them – assuming that it was possible for 
her to do otherwise. At the other end of the spectrum, reasonable 
expectations might hold between only two individuals. I might 
reasonably expect, for instance, that my wife – and only her – will 
laugh when I remind her of a certain anecdote. If she does not, it 
would not be entirely out of place to claim that she omitted to laugh.  
But, one may ask, whose expectation are we interested in? Suppose 
a paraplegic was unaware of her situation and intended to get out of 
______________ 
15 Of course, in this example the different expectations come from the fact 
that my guest and I share different cultural backgrounds. But it is clear that 
the source of the expectation is of no import here. What is important is that 
what we perceive as an omission depends on what we expect. And 
expectations are found only in people’s minds. 
16 Smith, P. (1990), “Contemplating Failure: The Importance of 
Unconscious Omission”. 
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bed17. Can she be said to have omitted to get out of bed given that 
she would have no reason to believe that she cannot – i.e. she would 
reasonably expect to be able to get out of bed? To me, it does not 
seem to be the right way to look at it. It would make the standard of 
reasonable expectation too subjective. A reasonable expectation is the 
expectation of a well-informed third party who knows enough about 
the relevant context and practices. She must also be aware of all the 
relevant elements (e.g. it would not be reasonable to expect Iris to 
have watered the plants if Larry lied about this being her 
responsibility18). The standard is not entirely subjective since any well-
informed and rational observer knowledgeable enough in the relevant 
context would, in principle, come to the same conclusion about 
whether a given course of action could be reasonably expected or 
not. Of course, some extreme cases may be more open to debate, but 
I believe they are the exceptions rather than the norm. The standard 
of reasonable expectation is an inter-subjective one19; it cannot 
depend on the judgment of a single person. 
Still, despite these precisions, the notion of reasonable expectation 
remains in flux. What is reasonable for one group will not be 
reasonable for another. While it may be reasonable for the 
eighteenth-century citizens of Königsberg to expect Kant to pass by 
at the same time every day, this same expectation would not be 
reasonable for their counterpart today. And what is reasonably 
expected in my family might not be in yours. This means that, most 
of the time at least, one’s omission is someone else’s non-action and 
vice-versa20. Given the relative character of reasonable expectations, 
______________ 
17 Clarke, R. (2010), “Intentional Omissions”, p. 163. 
18 Cf. McGrath, S. (2005), “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma”. While 
McGrath criticizes some conception of reasonable expectation, she defends 
an account of causation by omission in terms of “the normal”. Her account 
shares important similarities with what I mean – and what I believe Patricia 
Smith also means – by “reasonable expectation”. 
19 Some go so far as calling it objective. See for example Smith, P. (2005), 
“Feinberg and the Failure to Act”. 
20 Due to lack of space, I will not dwell any longer on the notion of 
reasonable expectation here. For an interesting and more detailed discussion 
on the matter, see Smith, P. (2005), “Feinberg and the Failure to Act”, 
especially p. 163-170. 
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it is easy to see that if the notion of omission really does hinge on 
that of reasonable expectation, it does not bode well for the idea of 
causation by omission. Unless, that is, non-actions themselves – or, 
more generally, absences – can have real causal powers. 
3. Can absences be causally efficacious? 
I subscribe to the generally accepted and, I think, rather intuitive 
process theory of causation which states that causation must involve a 
physical connection between causes and their effects. I take it that 
this view of causation is at least implicitly endorsed by an 
overwhelming majority of scientists. The most widely accepted model 
of causation in philosophy is what Helen Steward has called the 
network model of causation21. In this model, the causal universe is 
conceived of as a huge web with events as nodes bound together by 
causal relations. This model is perfectly compatible with the process 
theory. As Helen Beebee points out22, the assumption that the 
network model is right, combined with the further assumption that 
there are no negative events23, leads us directly to the conclusion that 
absences cannot have causal powers24. While there are still some 
issues with these accounts that need to be settled25, I think we should 
be very careful before rejecting what seems to me like a very 
convincing conception of causation. More specifically, I think it 
would be quite hasty to reject this conception on the sole basis that 
absences appear to have causal powers. However, some thinkers are 
not as reluctant as I am. Schaffer, for instance, fiercely argues against 
the process theory of causation: 
______________ 
21 Steward, H. (1997), The Ontology of Mind, chapter 7. 
22 Beebee, H. (2004), “Causing and Nothingness”, p. 291. 
23 Negative events are events that lack properties and which also cannot be 
particulars. Consider the absurdity of questions like “how loud was the non-
explosion?” and “how many non-explosions occurred?”.  
24 If causation is a relation between events and if omissions are not events, 
then causation by omission is a contradiction in terms. Mellor tries to work 
around this issue by defending an account of causation as a relation between 
facts (see for example Mellor, D. H. (1995), The Facts of Causation). 
25 See for example Dowe, P. (Fall 2008), “Causal Processes”; Schaffer, J. 
(Fall 2008), “The Metaphysics of Causation”.  
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to dismiss negative causation is to swallow the following: 
counterfactual, statistical, agential, evidential, explanatory, 
and moral implications are not marks of causation; the folk 
are wrong that voluntary human action is causal, the law is 
wrong that negligence is causal, ordinary language is wrong 
that “remove,” “release,” “disconnect,” and so on are 
causal; philosophers are wrong that reference, decision, 
and perception are causal; and scientists are wrong that 
electron–hole pair generation and other negative processes 
are causal. I submit that no theory so dismissive deserves 
to be considered a theory of causation26. 
As I see it, there seems to be two conflicting intuitions at the 
roots of this disagreement. On the one hand, those who reject 
negative causation rest their claim on a conceptual intuition, namely 
that causation involves a physical connection between at least two 
entities. On the other hand, those who defend the reality of negative 
causation seem to base their claim on the intuition that our common 
usage of the language of negative causation is largely right. At least 
one of these intuitions must be wrong and I will argue that the 
second intuition is, and that the term “cause” is often used too 
loosely. 
The first problem with the idea of causation by absences is that 
causes seem to produce their effects in virtue of their properties. It is 
in virtue of being square and heavy that the box leaves a square 
imprint on the carpet. And it is in virtue of being hot and somewhat 
triangular in shape that a hot iron forgotten on a shirt will leave a 
triangularish and fuming hole in my shirt. Properties seem to be quite 
relevant for causation. But it is the nature of absences to be devoid of 
properties. If there is no entity – i.e. if there is an absence –, there can 
be no property instantiated in that non-entity. Moreover, if we want 
to avoid the problem of disjunctive events in cases of causation – 
such as the cause of the accident being the child running in front of 
the car with clenched fists or with open hands, and so on27 –, we must 
pick out the properties that really do have causal efficacy in relation 
______________ 
26 Schaffer, J. (2004), “Causes Need not be Physically Connected to their 
Effects: The Case for Negative Causation”, p. 205. 
27 See Dowe, P. (2000), Physical Causation, p. 127. 
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to the effect in question. This means that what must be the right 
candidate for a given cause and a given effect is a class of events; i.e. a 
class of events that share all the causally efficacious properties in 
relation to the causal relations at play. So there is a sense in which the 
properties are more primitive, causally speaking, than the particular 
events per se. Dowe points out that the disjuncts in the case of 
positive causation are not highly disjunctive because they are 
“appropriately unified by similarity” – i.e. in virtue of their sharing 
some causally efficacious properties –, whereas the negative cases of 
causation are highly disjunctive28. There is an infinity of unrelated 
“negative properties” that could be relevant for a negative causal 
relation: my staying healthy could have been “caused” by my not 
drinking fifty milliliters of spoiled milk or by my not lying in the snow 
for thirty-six minutes while wearing only blue underwear and so on. 
Additionally, a positive case of causation generally has to be very 
specific. The slightest change generally brings about a very different 
effect (especially in the subsequent causal chain). But as the problem 
of disjunctive events shows, this does not seem to be true of 
absences29. An absent cause – or an absent effect, for that matter – 
need not be as specific. While the car that caused the accident might 
have been big, coming fast or made of steel, the car which I have not 
bought – thereby causing me to take the bus every day – might or 
might not have been big or fast or even made of steel30. It seems like 
those “properties” or any others have no further effect on my taking 
the bus. My taking the bus is not affected by the purported properties 
of the absent car. 
David Lewis – who welcomes the idea of causation by absences – 
recognizes the problem of disjunctive events. Lewis acknowledges 
that accepting the idea that absences can have causal powers creates 
many difficulties for his own counterfactual account of causation, but 
______________ 
28 See Dowe, P. (2000), Physical Causation, p. 127. 
29 Unless, maybe, we talk about absences in terms of degree: the absence of 
half the normal amount of air caused James to choke; or the absence of ten 
percent of the required amount of air caused James to choke. But notice the 
troublesome normative terms here. And notice also that the notion of 
absence could easily be put in terms of presence – i.e. a given amount of air. 
30 To paraphrase Clarke, is my lack of a phone my lack of an iPhone? 
(Clarke, R. (2012), “Absence of Action”, p. 362). 
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he nonetheless bites the bullet and clings to his belief in negative 
causation31. In addition to the problem of disjunctive events, Lewis 
identifies two more problems that seem to render causally efficacious 
absences incompatible with his account. The first one is that a 
counterfactual analysis of causation is supposed to apply between 
events, while an absence is precisely that: the absence of any event. 
As he puts it: “The counterfactual is not: if event c (the omission) had 
not occurred . . . It is rather: if some event of kind K (the omitted 
kind) had occurred . . .”32. The second problem is that a proper 
analysis of causation should allow us to clearly distinguish between 
different events, something absences render very difficult. Suppose 
an explosion did not occur. We might say that this absence prevented 
the death of some people, the destruction of a building and a loud 
noise being heard. But are these non-events distinct or is it the same 
non-event? Accepting the causal efficacy of absences seems to drag 
us down a rather inhospitable philosophical pit33. 
But then why do absences appear to have causal efficacy? Why 
does applying the brakes appear to prevent one from hitting the child 
in the middle of the road? Or why does a lack of glucose appear to 
cause hypoglycemia? I think the problem lies in our otherwise very 
useful ability to predict the likeliness of an event to occur. I also 
believe that this ability springs in large part from our prior experience 
of causal relations. We know from experience that when a heavy 
moving object hits another solid object standing in its path, there will 
be an impact; it will not go through it leaving the two objects intact. 
This is a classic case of causation. If the objects did pass through each 
other, we would be looking for some reason that would explain why 
the collision did not occur, why the expected causal relation did not 
take place. But notice that it would seem rather strange to ask what 
caused the lack of a causal relation in such a case. What we are looking 
for is an explanation for the absence of a physical impact between the 
two objects, but we are not looking for a causal explanation. Rather, 
______________ 
31 Lewis, D. (1987), “Postscripts to ‘Causation’”. 
32 Ibid., p. 192. 
33 Not to mention the fact that if causation does not require a physical 
connection between events, this would render the phenomenon of causation 
even more mysterious than it already is. If it is not a matter of physical 
connection, then what is causation? 
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we are looking for something that bears closer resemblance to a 
conceptual explanation. If I were to ask you why bachelors are 
unmarried, you would likely tell me that it is so because “bachelor” is 
what we call unmarried men ; that is because being unmarried is part 
of the meaning of “bachelor”. The use of “because” here has no 
causal import whatsoever. Being unmarried does not cause one to be 
a bachelor and neither is it an effect of being a bachelor. 
Likewise, when trying to find out why two objects passed through 
each other without any sign of impact, we look for an explanation 
that gravitates around our conception of causation. If causation 
requires a physical connection between two objects, then maybe one 
of these objects was not actually physical. Maybe it was just a 
projection on a screen that we mistook for a physical object. Or 
maybe the objects did not actually pass through each other but just 
passed by each other very closely, leaving us with the mere illusion 
that they passed through each other without colliding. These 
explanations tell us that the events that took place failed to meet the 
sufficient conditions for a causal relation to occur. There was no 
causal relation because the required conditions were not met. The term 
“because”, here, is not causal in nature; it is conceptual. 
This distinction, I believe, helps clear out some confusion. Bruce 
Vermazen claims that “if I intentionally pass up a chance to win at 
cards by laying down the ten of clubs, I have done something – 
performed an act – describable as not laying down the ten of clubs 
and as not bringing about my winning”34. As Vermazen sees it, 
refraining from laying down the ten of clubs caused my not winning. 
I think this is mistaken. It seems to me, rather, that not laying the ten 
of clubs, under those circumstances, was constitutive of losing the 
game. If causation is a sequence of events – as is generally accepted – it 
is clear that not laying the ten of clubs did not cause the failure to 
win. We can certainly say that scoring a goal caused a given team to 
win since that particular goal allowed them to have more goals than 
the other team. But it does not seem adequate to say that scoring 
more goals than the other team caused them to win. The rules of the 
game stipulate that winning is scoring more goals than the other 
team.  
______________ 
34 Vermazen, B. (1985), “Negative Acts”, p. 93-94. 
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But this is not enough. What I have just said explains that we 
might sometimes confuse a causal relation with a conceptual 
explanation about causation. The implication is obviously that this is 
often what happens in cases of negative causation. But what if we do 
seem to perceive a negative causal relation – rather than just the 
absence of a positive one? When we say that a lack of glucose caused 
hypoglycemia in the patient, we are not baffled by the absence of an 
expected causal relation; rather we mean to say that there was a causal 
relation, and that it was negative. I believe that this view is also 
mistaken; the apparent perception of a negative causal relation is 
illusory. The reason for this is, I believe, based on expectations.  
We all see certain things as normal and others as unusual, some 
behaviors as standard and others as deviant, some features of our 
lives are bland while others stick out more. Because accidents are 
statistically rare events, we view them as atypical events. We generally 
do not mention to people that we did not have an accident today35. If 
we did, the implication would clearly be that it was actually unusual 
for us not to have had an accident. But if a child stands in front of a 
moving car, we know that the car is likely to hit her. Although the 
event itself is unusual, the causal relation between the car and the 
child is one that we would expect given the context. If someone 
grabbed the child before the impact and pulled her away from the 
incoming car, we would readily say that this person prevented the 
accident from happening. In other words, we would tend to say that 
the person caused the absence of an accident. But this is only 
because, given the circumstances, we expected the accident to occur. 
The person’s pulling the child to safety explains why there was no 
accident, given our reasonable expectations founded on our prior 
experience of causation36. But it did not cause the absence of accident. 
Here again, we tend to confuse the explanation with an actual 
relation. If a billiard ball is a solid object – rather than, say, a 
hologram – it will collide with any ball on its path. Likewise, if the 
child had stayed in the car’s path, the car would have hit her. In both 
______________ 
35 Similarly, it would seem ridiculous to say “Lack of poison caused him to 
remain alive” (Armstrong, D. (1978), A Theory of Universals, p. 25). 
36 Dowe argues for something very similar, but he focuses on 
counterfactuals rather than on expectations (see Dowe, P. (2000), Physical 
Causation, chap. 6). 
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cases, we focus on – absent – factors we expected and from there we 
provide an explanation for the actual resulting state of affairs. We 
then mistakenly take this explanation for the actual causal relation. If 
the ball is a hologram, however, its being so cannot cause the lack of 
collision; it merely explains it. And the same is true regarding the car 
and the child37: there was no collision because there was no physical 
contact38. 
4. Mind-dependence 
I believe, along with others39, that every case of negative causation 
can be described in terms of positive causation and vice-versa40. In 
fact, since I believe only positive causation is genuine causation, what 
this really means is that negative causal explanations are always 
reducible to positive causal explanations41. To kill is to prevent from 
living; to sleep is to avoid being awake; to leave is to omit to stay; and 
so on. Claims like “John’s not having turned off the water caused the 
bath to overflow” may seem to not work this way. But in fact, what is 
______________ 
37 To take another example, we might be surprised that the plants died 
because, under normal circumstances, we would expect them to thrive. 
Upon learning that Jim omitted to water them we get a fuller understanding 
of the situation. This fact now explains why the plants are dead, an event we 
did not expect, but it does not describe a causal relation. All it does is provide 
us with the information that helps us understand why what we expected did 
not actually occur. 
38 I am aware that this seems to be begging the question. Many critics will 
point out that I am assuming here that causation is a relation between 
physical entities. Although this is true, I believe I have shown earlier that 
rival conceptions face too many problems to be taken seriously, at least as 
they relate to causation by absences. 
39 For example Armstrong, D. (2004), Truth and Truthmakers, p. 64 and 
Dowe, P. (2000), Physical Causation, p. 130. 
40 This is, of course, impossible to prove and if critics can provide a single 
counter-example for which no one could find a positive equivalent, then this 
would carry a great weight in favor of causation by absences. 
41 Notice that I am talking about explanations here. I do not mean to say that 
every omission corresponds to a positive action. I accept Sartorio’s position 
that for most omissions, there are no positive action that corresponds to 
them (Sartorio, C. (2009), “Omissions and Causalism”.) 
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really happening, most likely, is that gravitational forces are pushing 
the water out of the tap and into the bath. And the same gravitational 
forces pull the water onto the bathroom floor when the bath is full. 
Some may argue that this explanation is incomplete and that 
important pieces of information are missing42. I agree that from our 
perspective, this is a rather unsatisfying explanation. But it is so only 
because of our expectations. We normally expect the water not to 
overflow and so we want to know why it did on this particular 
occasion. Similarly, we know that the water will not flow out of the 
tap unless someone turns the tap on (which would lead us to argue 
that the tap being turned off prevents the water from flowing out). But 
causation does not and should not depend on expectations. 
Causation is a phenomenon that would occur regardless of our 
existence and regardless of what is usual or unusual. When the tap is 
turned off, the valve does not prevent the water from flowing out; it 
causes it to stay in the tap. We have an almost irresistible urge to talk 
of prevention because we already know what would happen if we 
turned on the tap, but causation is not a function of prior knowledge; 
causation has nothing to do with possible or foreseeable future 
events. Causation is strictly a matter of “right there, right now” and 
what happened before that. Talking of prevention or omission is 
talking about possible events that could happen or could have 
happened. I see no reason why causation, unlike other laws of nature, 
should have such a modal dimension. 
Of course it is often very hard not to talk in terms of negativity or 
of absence. Talks of debts, of something not being enough, of 
misses, and so on all imply some notion of absence. And it is 
perfectly fine that it should be like this. It would very often be too 
cumbersome to always speak in terms of positive causation. But this 
should not lead us to the belief that absences do exist, that they are 
real in a metaphysical sense. We also use definite and indefinite 
articles because it makes it much easier to understand each other. But 
this should not lead us to believe that there are such things as 
______________ 
42 Martin explains that if absences are not causally operative, they can 
nonetheless be causally relevant; that is, they can be explanatorily useful even 
if causally inert (Martin, C. B. (1996), “How it is: Entities, Absences and 
Voids”, p. 6). See also Molnar, G. (2000), “Truthmakers for Negative 
Truths”, p. 77-78. 
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definiteness and indefiniteness – or even articles, for that matter. 
Nothing is unbelievable per se. There is no such thing as the 
unbelievability of something. So we should not think that every word 
or every idea corresponds to something out there in the world. For 
pragmatic reasons, we should keep talking in terms of omissions and 
causation by absences, but we need to keep in mind that by doing so 
we are solely taking a linguistic shortcut. 
If we want a metaphysical account of causation, it must be mind-
independent. A mind-independent account of causation implies that 
there must be an entirely objective relation between causes and their 
effects. But an expectation, reasonable or not, is by nature subjective. 
Therefore, a metaphysical account of causation must not hinge on 
expectations – an effect is an effect whether we expect it or not. If 
causation is to be restricted to the physical realm, omissions or 
absences cannot be causes or effects, insofar as they cannot be 
separated from the notion of expectation. A witness who would not 
share our expectations should be able to observe the same causal 
relation that we observe. But it seems unlikely that such an observer 
would perceive absences without some expectation as to what might 
be absent. Imagine that a teacher always rolls up his sleeves at the 
beginning of a class43. A student who is new to the class could not 
possibly detect what surprises others when the teacher one day does 
not roll up his sleeves. The other students do not witness what they 
expect to witness and this causes them to be surprised44.  
From a third-person perspective, we can see a ball hitting another 
one and describe what we see without knowing what a ball, a cause or 
an effect are; or without expecting anything to happen before it 
happens. But we would not be able to notice the absence of an object 
or an action without any of this prior knowledge. The third-person 
______________ 
43 Smith, Patricia (1990), “Contemplating Failure: The Importance of 
Unconscious Omission”, p. 168. 
44 What causes their surprise is the fact that their expectation was not met. 
But what, in turn, causes their unmet expectation? What causes their 
expectation is a habit, but nothing causes their unmet expectation; that is 
nothing causes it to be unmet. It is just unmet because nothing caused it to 
be met. And, as is the case here, an unmet expectation – a mental  
state – generally and quite naturally causes some other mental states: 
surprise, anger, sadness, and so on. 
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perspective – the perspective one must adopt in order to give a 
metaphysical account of causation – must be purely descriptive and 
mind-independent. If Frank is in the bathtub, it is a mind-independent 
truth that he is in the bathtub. But it would be a mind-dependent truth 
that Frank is not getting out of the bathtub. This second truth relies 
on a comparison between the actual world and a possible world, and 
this comparative element is entirely mental. 
If what characterizes an absence and what differentiates it from a 
presence is simply a reasonable expectation, we cannot claim that 
absences have causal efficacy. Events can have causal efficacy, but 
not non-events. Expectations are not physical entities; there is 
nothing in an expectation that could confer causal powers to 
anything. And of course, their reasonableness will make no 
difference. If I unreasonably expect Klaus to die tomorrow, Klaus’s 
not dying does not have causal powers that would differ from that of 
his not dying in a case where my expectation would be reasonable. 
And if Mary does not expect him to die, she will react differently than 
I will upon meeting the living Klaus. But notice that, in both cases, 
the non-event is that he does not die; there does not seem to be two 
distinct non-events (if this even makes any sense). Our different 
reactions therefore cannot hinge on different non-events. What 
makes all the difference is the expectation; the relevant factor is 
therefore mental. It is our beliefs that cause us to react differently and 
nothing else45. 
Suppose I am determined to find the treasure at the end of the 
rainbow. I happen to believe that the rainbow ends just behind the 
hill. When I get there, not only did the rainbow disappear but I 
cannot find the treasure. I am disappointed. What caused my 
disappointment? Could it be the absence of the treasure? If so, then 
this is a very strange metaphysical entity. For either it exists 
independently of my mind or it does not. If it does and if I am the 
only person ever to believe there was a treasure at the end of this 
particular rainbow, it seems reasonable to claim that this entity 
cannot be perceived by anyone else than me. If the absence of the 
treasure has causal powers, then it must also have been caused, but it 
is hard to see what might have caused it. On the other hand, if the 
______________ 
45 Cf. Sartorio, C. (2009), “Omissions and Causalism”, p. 518 and Thomson, 
J. J. (2003), “Causation: Omissions”, p. 85. 
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“existence” of the absence depends on my mind, then it is hard to see 
why it belongs to the fabric of the world. It is arguable that ideas are 
part of the world, but claiming that their content is also part of the 
metaphysical world is harder to swallow. Moreover, how could I 
“create” entities like absences but not actual presences? This is quite 
mysterious. 
Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that the problem we started with can be 
solved by rejecting the idea that omissions and absences can be 
causally efficacious. Over the course of this article, I have argued that 
a central component of any omission – or any absence for that matter 
– is the notion of expectation. Expectations – reasonable or not – 
vary widely with contexts and this should be a strong indication that 
absences and causation cannot go hand in hand. If absences are 
largely mind-dependent, then they have no place in a metaphysical 
account of causation. There are at least two reasons why we are 
tempted to believe in the causal efficacy of absences. First, it is often 
much simpler to use the language of negative causation than that of 
positive causation. And second, we often confuse an explanation 
involving causal language with the causal relation itself. If I am right, 
we can do without the strange entities that absences would be and all 
the conundrums they would pose to metaphysics and action theory. 
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